INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") 1972 Pfizer 1 decision established the principle that an advertiser must possess and rely on a "reasonable basis" to substantiate advertising claims. By 1977 the Commission viewed this principle as "well-established."
[I]t is now well-established that in the absence of a contrary disclosure, a product claim necessarily carries with it a representation that 'the party making it possesses a reasonable basis for so doing, and that the assertion does not constitute mere surmise or wishful thinking on the advertiser's part.'
2
The 1983 Advertising Substantiation Policy Statement reaffirmed the "reasonable basis" doctrine. It concluded: "Objective claims for products or services represent explicitly or by implication that the advertiser has a reasonable basis supporting these claims. These representations of substantiation are material to consumers."
3
In 1984, the Commission faced a major challenge when Kellogg developed a marketing campaign for its high fiber All Bran cereal built around the recommendation of the National Cancer Institute ("NCI") that diets higher in fiber could reduce the risk of some kinds of cancer.
Under Pfizer, the FTC permitted health claims in advertising if those claims are adequately 1 Pfizer, Inc., 81 F. T.C. 23 (1972) .
2 Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 770, 866 (1977) (quoting Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 191 (1976 89, 191 ( ), modified, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979 ). The failure to possess a reasonable basis for objective claims was first held to be deceptive in National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488 (1973 ), modified, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974 . 3 FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, appended to Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 839 (1984) , aff 'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986 ).
substantiated. In contrast, in 1984, the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) regarded any label claim about the relationship between diet and disease as a drug claim. Unless a seller wished to file for approval as a drug, such claims were therefore illegal. In the 1960s, for example, FDA seized packages of Quaker Oatmeal as a misbranded drug, because the label discussed the relationship between fiber and serum cholesterol. Although some health claims were made in advertising, they were relatively infrequent until claims were also permitted on food labels.
Although the Kellogg campaign clearly violated existing FDA regulations, the FTC, in a highly publicized event, joined the NCI in supporting the ads. The FTC argued that Kellogg had the necessary level of substantiation. The FDA ultimately declined to take action.
The Kellogg episode illustrates the centrality of the substantiation doctrine to the From the beginning in Pfizer, a hallmark of the substantiation doctrine, and a key to its great utility, has been its flexibility. In general, the Commission has not attempted to use the doctrine to prescribe specific types of tests as the basis for particular classes of advertising claims. Moreover, the Commission has always recognized that the amount of evidence required depends on what the advertiser has said about the evidence.
7 Nestle HealthCare Nutrition, Inc., File No. 092 3087 (July 14, 2010) (claims of preventing or reducing the risk of upper respiratory tract infections).; The Dannon Company, Inc., FTC File No. 0823158 (December 15, 2010) (claims that covered products reduce the likelihood of getting a cold or the flu). These recent cases are inconsistent with the Commission's 1983 decision to modify an order prohibition to allow claims that a household disinfectant could reduce the incidence and spread of colds if supported by competent and reliable scientific evidence. See Sterling Drug, Inc. et al, 101 F.T.C. 375 (1983) . They are also difficult to square with the Commission's recognition " … that there may be certain limited instances in which carefully qualified health claims may be permitted under Section 5 although not yet authorized by the FDA, if the claims are expressly qualified to convey clearly and fully the extent of the scientific support." See Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, May, 1994. Interestingly, claims that a vacuum cleaner or an air cleaner reduce the chances of getting the flu are subject to the traditional "competent and reliable scientific evidence" standard. See Oreck Corporation, File No. 102 3033 (April 7, 2011) . Another order has an even broader scope of claims that require prior FDA approval. FTC v. Iovate Health Sciences USA, Inc., File No. 072 3187 (W. Dist. NY, July 14, 2010) (claims that a product "is effective in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of any disease").
limited." 8 Recent cases also indicate that the Commission is increasing the stakes for failing to have a reasonable basis, seeking monetary relief (even in administrative orders) for conventional substantiation cases.
9
If followed, these cases represent a significant ossification of a formerly flexible standard. To date, the cases setting a more rigid standard are consent agreements, although the notice order for one case currently in administrative litigation seeks an FDA prior approval requirement. 10 In its litigated district court cases, the Commission is not universally adopting the new approach. For example, the stipulated preliminary injunctions in its cases involving weight loss claims for acai berry products use the traditional "competent and reliable scientific evidence" standard for substantiation.
11
This paper discusses the role of the substantiation doctrine in protecting information in the marketplace. It then examines why the flexibility inherent in the doctrine is both appropriate and crucial to its utility as a consumer protection tool. Section IV addresses why "competent and reliable scientific evidence" is the appropriate standard for health-related claims about foods, and Section V discusses applying the standard to dietary supplements. Section VI explains why repudiation of the Pfizer factors cannot be justified as fencing in relief. A final section offers our conclusion.
II. INFORMATION IN MARKETS
Policing deceptive advertising is vital because of the critical role of information in competitive markets. Advertising, in the words of Nobel Laureate George Stigler, is "an immensely powerful instrument for the elimination of ignorance." 12 When more accurate information is available to consumers, competition operates more effectively to guide producers to the types of products that consumers most prefer. Consumers are more aware of alternatives across product categories, as well as within a particular market. The result is more competition to attract consumers, leading to enhanced competition for their business on both price and nonprice dimensions.
We begin with a discussion of the importance of the free flow of information to producing market outcomes that benefit consumers in Section A. Advertising also leads to product improvements, as we describe in Section B. Of course, advertising must be truthful and non-misleading. Allowing information that may be misleading will reduce consumer welfare, because consumer choices will then misdirect market outcomes. As is so often the case, the specifics of regulation matter. We consider how advertising regulation can provide the most benefit to consumers in Section C.
A. Advertising Often Enhances Competition, Reducing Prices.
Much of what we know empirically about the impact of advertising on market competition and consumer welfare stems from studies of restrictions on advertising. The first restrictions studied were relatively crude, often involving complete prohibitions on advertising obtained by professional groups seeking to limit competition among their members and thereby raise prices. One of the earliest studies examined state prohibitions on advertising of eyeglasses, and found that prices were significantly higher in states with such prohibitions. 13 Subsequent studies found that the adverse effects of restrictions on advertising were greatest for less advantaged consumers: the least educated paid the highest increase in prices from restrictions on advertising.
14 Similarly, states that prohibited advertising of the retail prices of prescription drugs had higher prices. 15 Such blanket prohibitions on advertising were overturned when the United States Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to commercial speech.
16
More subtle restrictions on advertising also have adverse effects on consumers. Attorney advertising restrictions, for example, varied considerably, with restrictions on broadcast advertising in some states, prohibitions on the use of pictures in others, and requirements for "dignified" advertising elsewhere. States with more restrictions on advertising had higher prices for routine legal services. 17 Other studies have also found that restrictions on the media where advertising is permitted are associated with higher prices. The ban on broadcast advertising of cigarettes, for example, increased cigarette prices. 18 The introduction of television toy advertising was associated with significant price declines, both over time as advertising was only with prior FDA approval of the claim's substance.
The changing rules governing permissible claims have provided a rich environment to study the impact of the content of seller-provided information on markets, as well as the impact of regulations on seller incentives to discuss certain product attributes. Studies of the impact of claims about the relationship between fiber and cancer, which launched the health claims era, found a significant market response. These advertising messages led to a demonstrable increase in fiber consumption. In part, the increase was the result of changes in purchasing patterns, but it also stemmed from product changes. Although the weighted average fiber content of breakfast cereals had been essentially constant for several years preceding the introduction of health claims, there was a positive and significant trend toward increased fiber content after the advertising began. There was no significant trend in fat or sodium content; the product improvements on the fiber dimension were not at the expense of deterioration on other aspects of nutrition. The increases in fiber consumption were greatest for economically disadvantaged groups. Although fiber consumption increased for all demographic groups, it increased more among racial minorities and female-headed households.
25
One particularly common health claim concerned the relationship between diet and heart disease or serum cholesterol. , 1977 , -1990 , , FTC (1996 . 28 Ippolito & Pappalardo, supra note 16.
advertising, health claims again began to increase. 29 By 1997, the end of the sample period, health claims again appeared in eight percent of ads, and heart and serum cholesterol claims had returned to just under four percent.
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Undoubtedly the new rules most heavily affected advertising for fats and oils. In 1988 and again in 1990, 45 percent of all advertising for fats and oils included a disease related claim.
These claims provided information about the importance of fat composition, particularly saturated fats, to the risk of heart disease. But by 1994, these claims had entirely disappeared from advertising for fats and oils, as the regulations required.
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With less ability to explain to consumers why fat composition mattered, there was also less incentive for fats and oils manufacturers to discuss fat composition at all. The total number of advertisements for fats and oils declined, as did the number of ads that included saturated fat content information. From a peak of 20 ads discussing saturated fat in 1992, the number of ads fell to only one in 1997. 32 Crucially, the shift in the informational content of advertising resulted in changes in the marketplace. With less information about both saturated fat content and its importance to health, consumer choices unfortunately shifted toward cooking oils with more saturated fat and less monounsaturated fat. Changes in advertising and consumer choices do not necessarily mean an improvement in consumer well-being. To best protect consumers, the government must consider the costs of both mistakenly prohibiting and allowing particular claims. Government should err on the side of protecting consumers, but doing so depends on which risk is more serious -mistakenly prohibiting truthful claims or mistakenly allowing false ones.
Consider, for example, the Kellogg claim about the relationship between diets high in fiber and the risk of colon cancer. Although the FDA believes that there is "substantial scientific agreement" that the claim is correct, uncertainty remains. There are, after all, no randomized clinical trials measuring the incidence of cancer at different levels of fiber intake, and such trials would surely increase our confidence in the truth of the claim. If the claim is true, however, waiting for the results of such trials would impose substantial costs on consumers, who would lose an important source of information about the likely relationship between fiber consumption and cancer risk. Before such claims were allowed, consumers ate less fiber, and as a result incurred a higher risk of cancer than necessary. On the other hand, if the claim turns out to be false, the consequences to consumers are relatively small. They may give up the better taste of another cereal, or pay a little more for a higher fiber product. 34 It seems clear that, in this case, the far more serious error is mistakenly to prohibit truthful claims. Such a mistake is worth avoiding, even though it means an increased risk of the far less serious error of allowing a false claim to continue.
35
Indeed, the FTC has made this very argument. Carol Crawford, the Bureau Director at the time, in a speech before the American Advertising Federation, praised the Kellogg claim, stating:
Caution, however, does not necessarily mean prohibiting a claim until all possible doubts have been resolved. Rather, caution requires that we carefully consider the consequences of both action and inaction. If we act to prohibit the Kellogg ad, few consumers will find out about the National Cancer Institute's recommendation.
If the N.C.I. is right, the result of prohibiting the ad may be that consumers will be ignorant about a possible way to reduce the likelihood of their contracting some types of cancer. If it turns out that the N.C.I.'s recommendation is wrong, the result may be that consumers may have eaten All-Bran when they otherwise might not have done so, perhaps giving up a better-flavored or a lowerpriced cereal to do so. Caution dictates that we avoid the more serious mistake.
III. FROM THE BEGINNING, APPLICATION OF THE SUBSTANTIATION DOCTRINE HAS RELIED CORRECTLY ON A FLEXIBLE STANDARD
The substantiation doctrine is a critical part of the Commission's efforts to police deceptive advertising. As one of us noted elsewhere, "protection of consumers against advertising fraud should not be a broad, theoretical effort to achieve Truth, but rather a practical enterprise to ensure the existence of reliable data which in turn will facilitate an efficient and reliable competitive market process." 36 The flexible reasonable basis standard is just such a 35 Typically, more is at stake in decisions about approving new drugs than in decisions about whether to allow diet and health claims. The critical issue, however, is the relative risk of the two potential mistakes, because reducing the risk of one mistake necessarily increases the risk of the other. It is not that foods offer greater benefits than new prescription drugs; rather, unlike prescription drugs, the potential benefits of allowing claims about diet and health even in the face of some uncertainty are vastly greater than the potential costs of allowing mistaken claims. 36 Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 681-83 (1977) .
practical tool.
Beginning with the original Pfizer decision that created the substantiation doctrine, the Commission has always considered various factors to determine the amount of substantiation necessary to constitute a reasonable basis for a particular claim. In Pfizer, the Commission identified:
(1) the type and specificity of the claim made, -e.g., safety, efficacy, dietary, health, medical; (2) the type of product -e.g. food, drug, potentially hazardous consumer product, other consumer product; (3) the possible consequences of a false claime.g., personal injury, property damage; (4) the degree of reliance by consumers on the claims; and (5) the type, and accessibility, of evidence adequate to form a reasonable basis for making the particular claims.
37
In the Advertising Substantiation Policy Statement, the Commission reiterated that
The Commission's determination of what constitutes a reasonable basis depends, as it does in an unfairness analysis, on a number of factors relevant to the benefits and costs of substantiating a particular claim. These factors include: the type of claim, the product, the consequences of a false claim, the benefits of a truthful claim, the cost of developing substantiation for the claim, and the amount of substantiation experts in the field believe is reasonable.
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The type of claim is critical in evaluating the required level of substantiation, because it determines the kind of support that consumers are likely to expect. As the Commission noted in Linking the required level of substantiation to the claim made also comports with First Amendment protection for commercial speech. The courts have overturned FDA decisions to ban health claims not supported by "substantial scientific agreement" because disclosures of the limitations of the evidence could achieve the goal of preventing misleading claims.
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When an advertisement is unclear about the nature of the supporting evidence, the Commission has sought to determine the optimal amount of evidence that is needed to support a particular claim. For most claims, different forms of evidence may exist that provide varying levels of confidence for assessing the likely truth of the claim. Even when only one form of testing is possible, the truthfulness of the claim can be made more certain by increasing the sample size, requiring the product to pass two or more independent repetitions of the test, or in other ways. In any substantiation case, the critical question is how much confidence in the likely 39 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 463 (1972) . 40 Litton Indus., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 1, 76 (1981) . See also Kroger Co., 98 F.T.C. 639, 737 (1981) ("Where the demands of the purse require such compromises, the advertiser must generally limit the claims it makes for its data or make appropriate disclosures to insure proper consumer understanding of the survey's results."). 41 FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, supra note 3. truth of the claim should be required before the claim is allowed.
Viewed as part of the practical enterprise to ensure reliable data, the Commission's focus on the optimal level of support for claims is sound. As the Pfizer factors recognize, the optimal amount of support for a particular claim is the amount that makes the expected gains from relying, or not relying, on the claim as large as possible, after considering the costs of more information. For example, consumers will purchase if the expected benefits of truthful claims outweigh the expected costs of a false claim. 43 This approach assures that consumers receive the largest possible expected gain from relying on the claim. Additional testing enables consumers (or the Commission) to estimate better the likely truth of the claim, and therefore to determine better the expected gain from relying on the claim. Testing is worthwhile as long as it increases the expected gains from relying on the claim by more than the cost of the test. More evidence than optimal reduces the expected gain, i.e., it increases the costs more than it reduces the risks of mistaken consumer decisions. Less evidence than optimal also reduces the expected benefits, because the increased costs of more testing are less than the decreased risk of mistakenly relying on false claims.
If the possible costs of a false claim are high and the possible benefits from a truthful claim are slight, the government should require more evidence before allowing the claim.
Claims about the safety of a drug that is substantially similar to other drugs on the market offer a clear example. The benefits of using the drug are limited to its therapeutic advantage over other products, but the potential costs if the claim of safety is false are substantial.
43 Thus, rational consumers will purchase if the probability that the claim is true, multiplied by the benefits if the claim is true, exceed the similarly weighted costs if the claim is false. The difference is the expected gain from relying on the claim. Other things equal, consumers will purchase if the expected gain from relying on the claim is positive; they will not purchase otherwise.
The Commission should require relatively less evidence of the probable truth of a claim, however, if the benefits of relying on the claim if it is true greatly exceed the costs of relying on it if it is false. Claims that products low in saturated fat help reduce the incidence of heart disease, for example, may enable consumers to reduce their risk of death from heart attack significantly. If the claim is false, consumers pay a few cents more or give up only an alternative product with more saturated fat that is perhaps better tasting. Because preventing such losses is important, the Commission should require substantiation for claims about the relationship.
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Because allowing claims that are likely true even in the face of some uncertainty is also important, it should avoid requiring too much substantiation.
Decisions about how much evidence to require also depend on the likely usefulness of additional testing. If additional testing will most likely confirm the results of previous tests, then additional testing is not very useful. Moreover, additional testing will at least delay the availability of the information to consumers, and may chill the claim entirely. If, on the other hand, the result of the initial evidence is unexpected or inconsistent with prior work, then additional testing is more likely to contradict it, and is therefore more valuable.
Consider, for example, a statistical test that indicates at the conventional 95 percent confidence level that there is a significant difference between two products. With such a test, there is by definition a five percent chance that the result is due solely to the peculiarities of the particular sample. Repeating the test would reduce that risk even further, but most likely, it will simply achieve the same result. 44 Of course, we do not suggest that an advertiser should be able to use an analysis of the relevant costs and benefits to support having no or nominal substantiation for a claim.
Just as a peculiar sample may find a difference that is not really there, the sample may also fail to detect a relationship that actually exists. Although larger sample sizes could increase the chance of detecting a real difference, they are more costly and the tests frequently take more time. As a practical compromise between these competing objectives, statistical tests and sample sizes are frequently chosen to have an 80 percent chance of detecting a difference (of a specified size) if it really exists. 45 That is, 20 percent of the time a test will fail to detect a real difference that in fact exists.
There is relatively little value in simply repeating a test. Repeating the test can reduce the five percent chance that the original result was simply due to the particular sample, because it is unlikely that both tests would find the difference statistically significant. 46 Unfortunately, however, it increases the chance that the pair of tests will fail to find a real difference that actually exists. That is, in the second test there is a 20 percent chance of failing to find a real difference because of the particular nature of the second sample. Both tests will only confirm the 45 A frequent criticism of clinical trials of drugs, for example, is that the sample sizes are too small to find differences statistically significant, even when the differences are clinically important. Indeed, this problem is a significant factor behind the rise of meta-analyses, which pool the results of individual trials to determine more accurately whether an effect exists. 
IV. SUBSTANTIATING HEALTH AND NUTRITION CLAIMS REGARDING FOODS
For decades, the FTC has required that most health or efficacy related claims for foods must be substantiated by competent and reliable scientific evidence. Occasionally, however, the agency and the staff have considered whether more stringent standards, modeled on the FDA's approach to regulation of new prescription drugs, should be adopted. 
A. The Costs of Mistakes.
Many have questioned whether the economic costs of the drug approval process are worth the benefits. 53 The costs of producing substantial evidence are themselves substantial.
Recent estimates place the cost of developing a successful new drug at over $800 million 54 -a figure that is likely comparable to the total revenues of many food products that make healthrelated claims. Only the potentially large public health impact of mistakenly allowing dangerous drugs on the market can justify such costs, and only the high prices that patented drugs command can support them.
For health-related claims about foods, the situation is completely reversed. In contrast to the relatively low risks of using a particular food, the risks of mistakenly prohibiting information about the health effects of dietary changes can be far more significant. If sellers cannot tell consumers about the potential health benefits of diets high in fiber, low in cholesterol, or of reducing trans fatty acids, many consumers will simply continue dietary habits that may in fact create significant health risks. Overly stringent regulation, which would result from applying drug standards to food claims, would inhibit or prevent truthful claims about the relationship to disease. Doing so creates risks to public health, because fewer consumers will hear or know of important information, and manufacturers will have greatly reduced incentives to improve products to reflect the implications of that information. When opportunities to reduce the incidence of disease are foregone because of mistaken and excessive regulatory requirements, the public's health suffers.
55 John E. Calfee & Janice K. Pappalardo, Public Policy Issues in Health Claims for Foods, 10 J. PUB. POLICY & MARKETING 33, 37-38 (1991) .
The risks of discouraging truthful claims with excessive testing requirements are particularly great for claims about the relationship between diets and disease. Because there are many dietary sources for any particular nutrient related to disease, other sellers will likely benefit when one company makes a claim. Because no one seller can capture all of the benefits of providing information, there is less incentive to provide the information in the first place.
Moreover, if product-specific testing is required, producers of substantially similar products can rely on the same tests. Unlike patented new drugs, the company that incurs significant testing costs cannot prevent imitation by competitors. Thus, other producers can "free ride" on the results of the test, undercutting the advantage to the seller who actually paid for the test.
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Of course, exaggerated or misleading claims about the health benefits of particular foods can harm consumers. The harm, however, is essentially economic. Consumers might pay more for a product or might purchase one brand instead of another that tastes better. Sound regulation should prevent such injuries, and therefore benefit consumers. Drug regulation incurs substantial economic costs in pursuit of important public health benefits. In contrast, applying similar approaches to health related claims for foods risks incurring significant public health costs in pursuit of economic benefits that are comparatively minor. As with many interventions intended to prevent ill health, the effectiveness of parachutes has not been subjected to rigorous evaluation by using randomised controlled trials. Advocates of evidence based medicine have criticised the adoption of interventions evaluated by using only observational data. We think that everyone might benefit if the most radical protagonists of evidence based medicine organised and participated in a double blind, randomised, placebo controlled, crossover trial of the parachute.
B. The Limitations of Clinical Trials.
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Of course, some aspects of parachutes, such as different designs or different deployment mechanisms, might be subject to randomized testing. Any trial, however, takes time. As one author noted, "waiting for the results of randomised trials of public health interventions can cost hundreds of lives, especially in poor countries with great need and potential to benefit. If the science is good, we should act before the trials are done." sugar alcohols in chewing gum and plaque pH, acid production, plaque quantity and quality, bacteria levels, and the incidence of caries.
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Similarly, the FDA approved a health claim regarding folate and neural tube defects relying on only one clinical trial. Even though the study was difficult to generalize to the population as a whole because it only included women with a history of neural tube defects in pregnancy, it was sufficient for the FDA to conclude that there was a significant reduction in risk when women supplemented their diets with high levels of folic acid. Most of the evidence the FDA considered consisted of non-clinical human studies, including four intervention trials with women at a high risk of a having a pregnancy with a neural tube defect because they had a personal history of having had such a pregnancy in the past.
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One clear illustration of the value of non-experimental evidence is knowledge about the side effects of drugs. Common side effects are discovered in clinical trials, but relatively rare side effects that may still pose a significant public health risk often do not occur until a drug has been on the market and used by millions. Under current FDA policy, a drug with a 1 in 1,000 chance of killing the patient would be barred from the market for anything other than an illness with a very high risk of fatality. Even in a clinical trial of 3,000 patients on such a drug, however, there is nearly a five percent chance that the side effect will not occur at all. 64 The probability that any one patient avoids the side effect is .999. The probability of all 3,000 patients avoiding it is .999 raised to the power of 1000, or 4.97 percent. In the standard clinical trial design, which allocates half of the patients to the treatment and half to the control, this would require a trial of 6,000 patients. In most circumstances, this "balanced" design is most efficient from a statistical perspective. In practice, individual trials with much smaller sample sizes are pooled to analyze the risk of side effects.
near this large. Instead, identifying rare side effects and warning patients and their physicians about them relies heavily on adverse event monitoring after a drug is on the market. This is essentially uncontrolled, observational evidence of the results of using a particular drug. It would not substantiate a claim of drug efficacy, but it is often the only evidence available about side effects.
C. Testing Products Versus Testing Ingredients.
As a matter of logic, virtually every individual product is a unique combination of ingredients. Both the ingredients and the process of combining them may substantially affect the characteristics of the final product. Eggs, for example, are the foundation ingredient of both soufflés and custards, but the final products are substantially different. Because different combinations of ingredients can produce different effects, it is tempting to conclude that all tests must use the actual product that is making the claim.
That conclusion, however, is not a sensible basis for regulatory policy. To continue the egg example, in both soufflés and custards, eggs contribute cholesterol and saturated fat to the final product. We can test the final product to measure how much of each is present, but we have no basis other than inference and assumption for concluding that the effects of the same amount of cholesterol and saturated fat is the same in each product. As a matter of logic, there could be other idiosyncrasies of the products and their ingredients that lead to different effects.
Nonetheless, the fundamental premise of nutritional labeling is that saturated fat is saturated fatit is likely to have the same effects on the human body in all of its manifestations, without regard to the other ingredients in the product. Abandoning that assumption would require us to abandon nutritional labeling as well.
Of course, for a particular product and a particular claim, there may be reason to suspect an interaction that would invalidate the results of studies on the ingredient in a different context.
If there is a sound reason to think that the particular combination of ingredients may undermine the applicability of studies demonstrating the ingredient's effects, then studies of the product itself would appear necessary to support a claim. The logical possibility that interactions could exist is not sufficient to warrant the costs of additional testing, however, any more than that same logical possibility would lead us to test for possible differences in the effects of saturated fat in custards and soufflés. Absent a good reason, relying on the normal assumption that the same ingredient is likely to have the same effects regardless of the other ingredients with which it may be combined is surely more reasonable. We could test to determine whether that conclusion is correct, but unless there is some reason to doubt it, there is no reason to do the test.
In fact, even the FDA relies on the ingredients approach. When it began the review of efficacy of "grandfathered" over-the-counter drug products under the 1962 Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, it concluded that a product-by-product review was neither feasible nor desirable. Many of these products had been on the market for decades, and their risks and benefits were relatively well known. Rather than rely on testing specific products, the agency decided to review the far smaller number of active ingredients, assuming that the effect of the active ingredient is the same regardless of the vehicle used to deliver it. The monograph process considered combinations of ingredients, but it retained the basic assumption that ingredients would determine the effects of the product and allows considerable leeway for combinations of active ingredients. 65 Moreover, manufacturers can use any inactive ingredients, as long as they do not interfere with the effectiveness of the active ingredients. 66 Thus, over the counter ("OTC") drugs do not require premarket approval if they meet the applicable requirements of the OTC drug monograph.
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Even for prescription drugs, the ingredient assumption is the basis of regulation. Generic versions of prescription drugs can be approved under an abbreviated new drug application, which only needs to show that the product is identical in active ingredient, dosage form, strength, route of administration, labeling, quality, performance characteristics, and intended use to a previously approved product. 68 Despite potential differences in formulations, additional clinical testing is not required.
If there are valid reasons to suspect that ingredients may interact in ways that undercut the effects of one or more of them, tests of the product itself may be essential to provide "competent and reliable scientific evidence." Under the "competent and reliable scientific evidence" standard, such product-specific tests would be required when experts in the field believe that the possibilities for interactions are significant. If so, tests on ingredients alone would not yield "accurate and reliable results." If not, there is no benefit from tests on the particular combination of ingredients found in an individual product. In some cases, dietary supplements are virtually indistinguishable from foods from a risk perspective. A bread or cereal fortified with vitamins and minerals is regulated as a conventional 69 Although such claims are not drug claims by law, they raise some of the same issues inherent in drug regulation. The risk-benefit profile of products like ephedra or certain forms of comfrey, for example, which pose significant health and safety risks for users, are closely akin to the risks and benefits of drugs. In recent years, the FDA has removed such dangerous products from the market entirely, an approach that is far more likely to protect consumers from safety risks than simply regulating the kinds of claims the sellers can make about product efficacy. 70 See e.g., F.T.C. v. Trudeau, 579 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2009 ). 71 We recognize that the Commission has recently experienced some difficulties in a few isolated federal district courts. Nevertheless, altering the long-standing definition of "competent and reliable scientific evidence" simply to avoid a handful of litigation defeats in federal court is unwise. It imposes too high a cost, as discussed above, and is premature given the dearth of other courts, particularly appellate courts, applying the standard in a manner that the Commission believes to be incorrect. 72 Although safety-related withdrawals of dietary supplement ingredients have occurred, far more common are contamination or impurity problems with particular products, risks that are much more akin to the risks that a food will be recalled because of bacterial contamination. They are problems in the manufacturing process, rather than problems with the use of the supplement itself.
V. SUBSTANTIATING HEALTH AND NUTRITION CLAIMS REGARDING DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS
food. Take away the cereal, however, and the product is a dietary supplement. 73 It might be somewhat easier to overdose on the supplement than on the food, but there is no other meaningful difference. Indeed, product-specific testing requirements are particularly inappropriate for claims about the effects of vitamin and mineral fortification, because the basic science for the effects of such supplements on the structure and function of the body is clear and well understood. Unlike foods, dietary supplements are prohibited if they present a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury, and the FDA can ban any supplement that presents an imminent hazard to public health or safety. 74 Because the risks for supplements are usually low and because of the substantial experience base, there is simply no reason to invoke the elaborate premarket safeguards of the drug approval process.
As it has in other areas, the Commission has always relied on the flexibility of the In 2000, the Commission unanimously denied a petition for rulemaking to set more specific substantiation requirements for dietary supplement claims. The agency reviewed the principal questions the petition raised regarding the types and amount of substantiation required, in each case relying on the Guides to address the question. It concluded:
The Commission is committed to providing clear and specific guidance on its enforcement policies to dietary supplement marketers and to all other industries it regulates. For this reason, the agency has engaged in extensive efforts to define its substantiation standard and to illustrate, through its Supplement Advertising Guide, how that standard applies to supplement advertisers.
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The FTC explicitly rejected more specific substantiation standards. It noted:
the Commission's substantiation doctrine allows for some flexibility in the type and amount of evidence required depending on the nature of the claim and how it is presented and qualified. The Commission has determined that further refinement of the standard through rulemaking might result in a more rigid standard that, in some instances, could be higher than necessary to ensure adequate scientific support for certain specific claims.
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VI.
REPUDIATION OF THE PFIZER FACTORS CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED AS FENCING IN.
The likelihood of setting a standard that is "higher than necessary to ensure adequate scientific support" is no different when the Commission imposes a more rigid standard as an order provision, rather than through rulemaking. The scope of the potential damage is formally 76 Guide supra note 41 at 9. clearly agreed with the Commission, however, on most of the specific claims that were at issue in the proceeding. It found that claims that a calcium supplement offered unique benefits, was more absorbable, and superior to prescription treatments for osteoporosis were violations of the order. Nevertheless, it accepted the District Court's conclusion that claims the product increased hip bone density despite the lack of a test of the product itself, because the evidence was clear that calcium had that effect and the source of the calcium was irrelevant. As discussed above, this recognition that ingredient testing alone may be sufficient is entirely appropriate. The
Circuit Court also accepted the District Court's finding that claims that a fertility supplement would cause sperm courts to "skyrocket" in 30 days did not violate the order. The Commission's expert apparently conceded that the product would increase sperm counts, but argued that the process would normally take three months. Moreover, he appeared to agree that there could be effects within 30 days. Although it remanded the Commission's allegation that the company had misrepresented research results, the Court also made clear its view that the claims likely were violations.
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Although the Commission does not win every case it brings, it certainly wins the overwhelming majority. That fact alone makes clear that a more specific standard is not necessary to simplify enforcement. Lane Labs is no exception; the Commission prevailed in the Circuit Court where its case was strong, and lost where it was challenging claims about which reasonable experts disagreed. In most instances, Commission orders include "fencing in" relief to cover more products or more claims from a company that has violated the law. There is no sound reason, however, to require past violators to meet a higher burden to substantiate the likely truth of their claims. A more specific requirement would not "fence in" proven violators; rather, it would "wall off" truthful claims that would be quite valuable to consumers.
One could argue that the Commission needs tools to increase deterrence regarding claims that it has frequently challenged. That, however, is an argument for increased or different sanctions, not an argument for a different standard of proof. In pursuing fraud, for example, the Commission has increasingly sought to work with the criminal enforcement authorities to achieve stronger sanctions and more effective deterrence; it has not sought to redefine fraud.
Prohibiting claims that are truthful and not misleading deters, but it only deters precisely those claims that the Commission should seek to encourage.
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A more specific standard, such as "two clinical trials," would also abandon what has always been the Commission's best argument as to why substantiation orders do not violate the First Amendment. The "competent and reliable scientific evidence" standard clearly tailors the substantiation requirement to the claim that is made, including whatever qualifications and 85 The Commission may, of course, lose some substantiation cases because a court finds that experts for the respondent are credible and reasonable, even though they disagree with the Commission's experts. When there is legitimate debate among experts about either the truth of a claim or the appropriate methodologies for testing it, the fundamental premise of the First Amendment is that consumers should be able to hear both sides of the argument. The Commission's proper role is to prevent advocates of any point of view from exaggerating their case, not to determine which side of a scientific debate is correct. See Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 570 F.3d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1977) ("The FTC concluded that, impossible though it may be to determine whether consuming eggs in fact increases the risk of heart and circulatory disease, it is possible to determine the existence and amount of evidence on that issue."). See also Sterling Drug Inc., 101 F.T.C. 275, 377-78 (1983) (Modifying Order). ("Most of these issues are now controversial, and there are reputable scientists on both sides of the controversy. We believe that an absolute ban on claims for which there may be reputable scientific support is inappropriate. On the other hand, we believe that such claims must not be made in such a way that they assert or imply that the propositions in question have been established to the satisfaction of the scientific community, unless such is the case. Consequently, we have modified the order to allow claims … to be made if they are supported by competent and reliable scientific evidence.") disclosures the advertiser may include to make clear to consumers the limited nature of the supporting evidence. In rejecting the petition for rulemaking and its First Amendment challenge to the substantiation doctrine, the Commission noted the petition's mistaken presumption that the FTC's basic approach is to ban claims if the scientific evidence does not rise to a certain level of support. As the letter noted,
In fact, the Commission has a long history of allowing, and even encouraging, the use of disclaimers or qualifiers as a means of curing potential deception. The Commission reiterated this policy in its 1994 Food Policy Statement and again in the 1998 Supplement Advertising Guide. Both documents clearly acknowledge that there is room for carefully qualified claims based on emerging science, provided the claims are expressly qualified to convey effectively the extent of the scientific support.
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When the Appeals Court rejected the FDA's ban on health claims that were not supported by "significant scientific agreement" on First Amendment grounds, it did so precisely because it believed that carefully qualified claims could avoid the risk of deception even when significant scientific agreement did not exist. The FTC's own empirical studies of qualified health claims support that conclusion. 87 As the staff noted in its comments to the FDA, "On average, consumers were able to discern clear differences in the level of certainty communicated by these [tested] claims." 88 met before certain claims are permissible. The requirement for prior FDA approval effectively incorporates into FTC orders the "significant scientific agreement" standard that the courts have rejected on First Amendment grounds. Similarly, the "two clinical trials" standard will likely prohibit carefully qualified truthful claims that do not meet the standard, and thus are not likely to mislead reasonable consumers.
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Moreover, in the practical enterprise of day to day decision making, knowing that precisely one clinical trial supports an important health related claim is every bit as valuable to consumers as it is to the scientists who examine that study in the continuing pursuit of Truth. In this context, the requirement for a second clinical trial appears unnecessary to insure truthful, useful claims. Certainly, no court has ever suggested that reducing the government's litigation costs or risks is a "substantial governmental interest" justifying restrictions on truthful commercial speech.
As noted above, the adverse effects of the Commission's recent orders on truthful speech are not confined to those who are subject to orders. Responsible companies will have little choice but to conform to the new standards to avoid the risk of Commission challenges, which have substantial adverse effects on capital market values. 90 The risk is compounded by the Commission's apparent recent practice of seeking financial relief in 89 By its nature, "competent and reliable scientific evidence" requires different amounts of evidence depending on the specifics of the covered claim, because the kinds of evidence that experts would think necessary to support a qualified claim will frequently differ from what is needed to substantiate unqualified claims. Thus, the standard permits claims that appropriately describe the available evidence even when that evidence would not support an unqualified claim. With a clinical testing requirement, however, any covered claim must be supported by clinical testing, regardless of how it might be qualified and regardless of whether it is misleading. routine substantiation cases. The result is likely to be an undue chilling effect on truthful commercial speech, even for those not subject to an FTC order.
VII. CONCLUSION
There has been no significant change in the basis for retaining the flexible substantiation standard in the nearly 40 years since the Commission first adopted it. There has been no significant change since the Commission reiterated that standard in the Advertising Substantiation Policy Statement in 1983. Nor has there been any significant change in the basis for the "competent and reliable scientific evidence" standard for health-related claims in the decade since the Commission specifically refused to abandon it. In the intervening years, the Commission has successfully prosecuted numerous cases involving health-related claims for both foods and dietary supplements. There is nothing in that record of enforcement success that would remotely suggest the need for more specific standards to ease the Commission's burden in proving an advertiser's substantiation inadequate. As the Commission has recognized from the beginning of the substantiation doctrine, an arbitrary, inflexible standard would deny important information to consumers. That conclusion is as applicable today as it was in 1972. DC1:810210.1 
